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Human rights campaigners, activists and litigatorshave been seeking ways and means to holdaccountable those responsible for gross human
rights abuses and violations. These measures have included
seeking the criminal prosecution of the individual human
rights perpetrator, as well as seeking civil damages against
individual actors.
The rationale and means of human rights protection can
be found in the international legal system. International
law plays two critical roles in relation to the protection of
human rights. First, it establishes acceptable norms of
conduct, such as the prohibition of torture. Second, it
provides, where possible, enforcement mechanisms that
aid and support the domestic enforcement of these norms
(Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein, “Corporate
Accountability in Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines
the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights,”
(2010) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 119, 124).
The protection of human right reflects on the hybrid
nature of its origin, rationale and raison d’etre, which
holistic nature can be best summarised in the words of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which
said that whereas:
“the international protection of human rights should not be
confused with criminal justice. […] The objective of
international human rights law is not to punish those
individuals who are guilty of violations, but rather to protect
the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages
resulting from the acts of the States responsible” (see the
Velasquez Rodriguez decision of 1988 (Ser C No 4 reported
in (1988) 9 Human Rights Law Journal 212, para 134)).
However, at present there seems to be a lack of an
effective international enforcement mechanism for human
rights abuses. The existing UN Charter and treaty-based
human rights systems suffer in general from an absence of
strong and effective inter- and intra-state accountability
mechanisms. Consequently, the existing human rights
protection regimes are “weak” in terms of available
sanctions and remedies against a violating state and even
weaker in respect to the eventual enforcement of such
sanctions (Cf Bachmann, Civil Responsibility for Gross Human
Rights Violations – the need for a global instrument, monograph
published by Pretoria University Law Press (PULP)).
Measures to ensure compliance and redress for human
rights violations have often focused solely upon the
domestic sphere. The reasons for this are due to the
perceived relationship between national and international
law. The prevailing view of Anglo-American jurisprudence
views national law as having primacy over international law:
international laws apply when the nation state passes
treaties or statutes which make clear their applicability.
(Hans Kelsen, “Sovereignty and International Law”,
(1960) 48 The Georgetown Law Journal 627, 630).
There are generally two routes for the restitution of
human rights violations: the domestic, territorial, and the
transnational, extraterritorial litigation approach. The
domestic route allows for citizens who have suffered
wrongs from their government or other private actors to
bring cases in the courts of their own state. The
transnational route allows for victims of human rights
abuses to bring actions in other states. Both approaches have
their weaknesses.
The national approach relies upon the nation state itself
to provide justice in its court system and court procedure.
The transnational approach could lead to the nation state
being inundated with transnational claims and seeking to
foreclose any future claims. After a state allows for the
redress of violations of international law in its courts, that
state can become a focus for the global human rights
movement. Such a move has occurred most famously in the
United States. Developed as litigation against the individual
perpetrator and the corporate aider and abettor of human
rights violations, it is known by the shorthand of human20
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rights litigation. Developed over the last 30 years, this form
of extraterritorial litigation has altered existing perceptions
that only states could commit such human rights atrocities
and that accountability could only be sought within the
parameters of existing interstate relations.
“Human rights litigation contributes to an important long-
term objective: working toward a world in which those who
commit gross violations of human rights are brought to justice
swiftly, in whatever country they try to hide” (Beth Stephens,
International Human Rights Litigation in US Courts
(2008)).
In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
the case of Filártiga (Filártiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980), 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1994) ruled that individual
aliens could bring claims for violations of the law of nations
under the Alien Tort Statute, or ATS. This has led to cases
being brought in US Federal courts claiming damages for
genocide, war crimes, summary execution, disappearance,
and arbitrary detention.
Yet, the ATS litigation which has reached the Supreme
Court points to a sceptical outlook for extraterritorial
claims. In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain (Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692 (2004) (SCOTUS), the court considered a claim
brought under the ATS by a Mexican citizen against another
Mexican citizen for a kidnapping that occurred in Mexico
(Sosa, 714). The court in their decision limited the
applicability of the ATS. The court accepted that federal
courts did have jurisdiction over torts in violation of the
“law of nations”, but strictly limited the category of offences
which were defined by their universal acceptance, their
obligatory nature and high degree of specificity (Sosa, 732).
This limitation upon ATS litigation could be in the
process of being extended. In Kiobel, the question posed
before the court was whether corporate civil tort liability
under the ATS justiciable, or whether corporations were
immune for tort liability under the ATS Kiobel v Royal Dutch
Petroleum, No. 10–1491 (argued February 28, 2012)
(SCOTUS)). During oral argument, Justice Alito expressed
concern at the very extraterritorial nature of the ATS:
‘The first sentence in your brief in the statement of the case is
really striking: “This case was filed ... by twelve Nigerian
plaintiffs who alleged ... that respondents aided and abetted
the human rights violations committed against them by the
Abacha dictatorship ... in Nigeria between 1992 and 1995.”
What business does a case like that have in the courts of the
United States?’(Kiobel, oral transcript, p 11, 16–24
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transc
ripts/10-1491.pdf)
Justice Alito thus clarifies the court’s concern in Sosa –
why should offences committed abroad be justiciable in
American courts? Do prudential considerations (ensuring
certainty in the law) disqualify such extraterritorial actions?
These concerns point toward a larger issue underlying
the court’s decision-making, namely the rule of law. There
is an ambiguity surrounding the rule of law at the heart of
historical justice litigation. Historical justice litigation is
marked by an adherence to the rule of law, a desire to see
the rule of law upheld and justice done. However, such
litigation supports a substantive, rather than a formal,
conception of the rule of law. The dichotomy between
formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law is
crucially important in determining the nature of the
specific legal precepts which can be derived from it (Craig,
“Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law:
An Analytical Framework” 1997 Public Law 467).
The term appears so self-evident that it seems to need
no definition. However, this lack of definition brings to the
fore the importance of whether the rule of law is given
substantive or formal meaning. Formal conceptions of the
rule of law address the manner in which the law was
promulgated, the clarity of the ensuing norm and whether
the norm was promulgated prospectively or retrospectively
(Craig 467). Such conceptions do not seek to pass
judgment upon the actual content of the law itself. This can
be contrasted to substantive conceptions of the rule of law,
which seek to develop certain substantive rights which are
claimed to derive from, or be based upon, the rule of law.
The rule of law founds these rights, which can be used to
distinguish between “good” laws which comply with such
rights, and “bad” laws which do not (Craig 467–68).
The content of this foundational legal concept will differ
greatly depending upon whether a procedural or
substantive viewpoint is adopted. This is the case as there
are certain principles which can be posited as forming part
of the rule of law. The most important can be said to be the
principle that all persons are to be treated equally under
the law. The implications of this principle, equal treatment
under the law, differ depending on whether formal or
substantive definitions of equality are adopted. Formal
equality is as old a principle as Western political
philosophy: if two persons have equal status in at least one
normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally
with regard to this respect. As Aristotle stated, we are to
“treat like cases alike” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
(1984), Book 5 3 1131a10–b15).
It was a concern for the key formal principles of the rule
of law which led the Supreme Court to order Kiobel to be
expanded and reargued. The new question the court will
answer is:
“Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States”, (10–1491, Kiobel, Esther, et al. v Royal Dutch
Petroleum, et al., Order in Pending Case, March 5, 2012,
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/03/10-1491-order-rearg-3-5-12.pdf)
The overall impact of the ruling in Kiobel for the future
scope of human rights actions in the context of the 21
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extraterritorial commission of breaches of international
law in direct and indirect liability will have to be seen.
Irrespective from Kiobel, the aim of human rights
litigation of bringing human rights violators to court seeks
to provide justice to the individual victims. It can achieve
redress where other remedies fail, provide recognition for
“crimes which men can neither punish nor forgive”
(Hannah Arendt, cited in Jeremy Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide
of the Herero, 1) serving as a tool of corrective justice,
addressing a moral obligation and need. Such litigation can
also serve the aim of retribution and deterrence through its
high damages available, or it can serve the idea of
reconciliation.
All these remedial ideas have to be seen, however, against
more practical questions, such as to how much a financial
settlement will actually recompense for human rights
violations. What do the claimants want? Do they want a
monetary sum, or official recognition and apportionment
of blame for the wrongs that they suffered?
This short submission ends with the recognition of the
important role which historical justice litigation can play in
the context of human rights atrocities – past and present.
US transnational litigation acknowledges the victim of
human rights abuses as an individual claims holder and
allows him a right to participate in the remedial process by
recognising the independent right of ius standi of the victim.
This right to remedial justice has been recognised in
another jurisdiction, namely the United Kingdom, when
the High Court allowed, at least in part, Kenyan victims of
UK’s counter insurgency measures during the Mau Mau
emergency in Kenya during the 1950s, to sue the British
government for alleged human rights violations (Ndiku
Mutua and others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
[2011] EWHC 1913 (QB)).
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